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Nasty Women and the Rule of Law
By ALICE WOOLLEY and ELYSA DARLING*
“Such a nasty woman.”1
“There’s just something about her that feels castrating, overbear-
ing, and scary.”2
“She undoubtedly suffered in the trial . . . but she was not
likable.”3




NO ONE ENTERS THE LEGAL PROFESSION expecting social pop-
ularity—or, at least, no one should.6 But recent events create the im-
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1. Daniella Diaz, Trump calls Clinton ‘a nasty woman’, CNN (Oct. 20, 2016), http://
www.cnn.com/2016/10/19/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-nasty-woman [https://
perma.cc/U94K-H8L3].
2. Yvonne A. Tamayo, Rhymes with Rich: Power, Law and the Bitch, 21 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 281, 286 (2009) (quoting Tucker Carlson on Hillary Clinton during her 2007-2008
run for the Democratic presidential nomination).
3. Tim Cornwell, When Marcia Clark failed to persuade a jury that OJ Simpson was guilty of
murder, she fell from grace with a bump – less a legal eagle than a dead parrot. Today’s the day she
gets her own back, THE INDEPENDENT (May 8, 1997), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/when-marcia-clark-failed-to-persuade-a-jury-that-oj-simpson- [https://perma.cc/
75UG-X95Y].
4. Steve Simon (@the_stevesimon), TWITTER (Mar. 30, 2016, 7:12 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/the_stevesimon/status/715179945786544128 [https://perma.cc/ZKA6-QZ63]
(discussing how Marie Henein successfully defended Canadian radio personality Jian
Ghomeshi from accusations of sexual assault).
5. Meghan Murphy, Marie Henein: Not a feminist, not a surprise, FEMINIST CURRENT
(Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.feministcurrent.com/2016/04/04/marie-henein-not-a-femi-
nist-not-a-surprise/ [https://perma.cc/Q9B4-3WNL].
6. See e.g., Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass,
75 CAL. L. REV. 379, 380 (1987); Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 IND.
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pression that women lawyers face more than the generic suggestions
of dishonesty, untrustworthiness, greed, and adversarialism that typify
anti-lawyer criticisms.7 For women lawyers, attacks and criticisms are
not only role-related (arising from her occupation in a professional
role) but also personal, specific, and gendered. Lawyers in general are
labeled as morally troubling; women lawyers risk being specifically and
personally identified as morally transgressive, even when performing
acts expected of a person in their role.8 Women who take on law firm
leadership, advocate in notorious trials, lead teams in complex corpo-
rate transactions, demonstrate political ambitions or political leader-
ship—that is, women who do things that lawyers might normally be
expected to do—risk gendered and hostile forms of criticism. They
risk being labeled unlikable, unattractive, unfeminine, unpleasant,
and immoral—basically, a bitch. Such attacks are not certain to occur.
They may be more likely for some women than for others and the
form and tone that attacks take almost certainly vary with context. But
a woman who chooses to enter the legal profession does not just risk
generic unpopularity—she also risks being labeled a “nasty woman.”9
That is the premise of this paper. We do not prove that women
lawyers risk being attacked in this way, although we note some exam-
ples of those who have. We also respond to some objections to this
premise and discuss the extent to which gender equality has eluded
the legal profession to this day, even in comparison to other profes-
sions. Primarily, we focus on why gendered and personal attacks on
women might occur. Why did the criticisms of Marcia Clark’s han-
dling of the OJ Simpson Trial have an unpleasant sexist undercur-
L.J. 911, 911–12 (1996); Thomas W. Overton, Lawyers, Light Bulbs, and Dead Snakes: The
Lawyer Joke as Societal Text, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1069, 1073–74 (1995); Ronald D. Rotunda, The
Legal Profession and the Public Image of Lawyers, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 51, 53 (1999); W. Bradley
Wendel, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Lawyer-Bashing: Some Post-Conference Reflec-
tions, 54 S. C. L. REV. 1027, 1033–36 (2003).
7. Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L.
REV. 633, 634–37 (1994) (identifying the four “clusters” of complaints about lawyers).
8. See Caryn Ganz & Patrick Healy, Madonna and Hillary: “Witch” and “Nasty Woman”
as Sisters in Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/11/arts /
music/madonna-hillary-clinton-renegades.html (discussing that the criticisms both women
have received are troubling, and the connection we make between them is that Madonna
suffers misogynist attacks because she is a woman who embraces violations of conventional
moral standards; Hillary Clinton suffers misogynist attacks because she is a woman and her
role—as lawyer and as politician—requires her to occupy morally problematic space)
[https://perma.cc/7XW7-WM2A].
9. Diaz, supra note 1.
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rent?10 Why do commentators discussing the highly successful
Canadian defense lawyer Marie Henein invariably focus on her high
heels, clothes, and attractive appearance?11 Why was Hillary Clinton
attacked in vicious and misogynist ways from the very beginning of her
time in the public eye and throughout her final, unsuccessful run for
the Presidency?12
Our thesis is that attacks on women lawyers arise from the inter-
section between the normative structure of the lawyer’s role and sexist
stereotypes. The lawyer’s function in achieving the social settlement of
law, including maintaining the rule of law, requires lawyers to occupy
positions of moral ambiguity and power. Lawyers have the privilege
and responsibility to pursue the interests of their clients within the
bounds of legality, even where doing so inflicts harm or violates val-
ued norms of ordinary morality. That role makes all lawyers unpopu-
lar.13 However, when this is combined with prescriptive gender
stereotypes about appropriate conduct for women,14 it makes women
lawyers seem not merely morally dubious, but personally dangerous.15
10. See generally, Rebecca Traister, Marcia Clark is Redeemed, N. Y. MAG. (Feb. 17, 2016),
http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/02/marcia-clark-redeemed-c-v-r.html (discussing the sex-
ist coverage of Marcia Clark) [https://perma.cc/5GCT-RC4V]; Sara Boboltz, Marcia Clark
Couldn’t Escape Brutal Personal Media Attacks During OJ Simpson Trial, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/marcia-clark-nude-photos-oj-simp
son-trial_us_56e04ebee4b0860f99d75b78 [https://perma.cc/WUD6-5F83].
11. Anne Kingston, The Ghomeshi trial’s one taboo: Marie Henein’s shoes, MACLEANS (Jan.
9, 2016), http://www.macleans.ca/culture/the-ghomeshi-trials-one-taboo-marie-heneins-
shoes/ [https://perma.cc/8ESH-MXAH]; Marci McDonald, The Fixer, TORONTO LIFE (Oct.
20, 2015), http://torontolife.com/city/crime/marie-henein-jian-ghomeshi-lawyer/
[https://perma.cc/Z5D7-AF7C].
12. Tamayo, supra note 2 (discussing examples of earlier sexist discussions of Clin-
ton); Deborah L. Rhode, Diversity and Gender Equity in Legal Practice, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 871,
880–81 (2014) [hereinafter Rhode, Diversity]. See Rebecca Solnit, From Lying to Leering, 39
LONDON REV OF BOOKS 3, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n02/rebecca-solnit/from-lying-to-
leering [https://perma.cc/5AF5-Z7B7]. We discuss below the objection that attacks on
Clinton are not a relevant example for a paper about women lawyers since arising from her
power and political role, not from the fact that she is a lawyer. In short, politics and law are
closely analogous roles, and attacks on Clinton have at times focused on her status and
work as a lawyer, including in the last presidential campaign.
13. Wendel, supra note 6, at 1036.
14. Laurie A. Rudman & Julie E. Phelan, Backlash effects for disconfirming gender stereo-
types in organizations, 28 RES. IN ORGAN. BEHAVIOR 61, 63 (2008) (discussing how descriptive
gender stereotypes are stereotypes about how women and men are—their attributes and
abilities; and how prescriptive gender stereotypes are stereotypes about how women and
men ought to be. Research may suggest that even as descriptive stereotypes evolve, pre-
scriptive stereotypes remain robust today: “the same traits deemed most desirable for wo-
men in the 1970s continue to be viewed as most desirable for women today”).
15. See generally, Madeline E. Heilman, Gender Stereotypes and workplace bias, 32 RES. IN
ORGAN. BEHAVIOR 113, 113–35 (2012) (discussing prescriptive gendered stereotypes about
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The perceived danger presented by a woman lawyer connects to an
individual woman where she, specifically, presents the danger, rather
than simply being part of a group or category of dangerous people,
and she invites the moral outrage.16 The dissatisfaction and criticism
arising from a woman lawyer in her role will not be directed at law-
yers, or even at women lawyers; it will be directed just at this one par-
ticular “nasty woman.”
This paper sets out this thesis, and considers its ramifications for
women, the legal profession, and the rule of law that the lawyer’s role
is designed in significant part to achieve. The paper simplifies the
analysis insofar as it discusses the problem of attacks on women with-
out separating out additional complexities and issues for women of
color or LGBTQ women. It also does not consider the question of
whether the issue and analysis here would apply to men of color. In
our view, these additional questions merit consideration. Our analysis
applies to women generally, but issues of race, gender and sexual ori-
entation mean that the issue is more complex than our analysis re-
flects.17 We also suspect that men of color experience similar
problems, as suggested by some of the racist attacks on President
Obama.18 This paper starts the conversation, but does not conclude
it.19
women in Part II and Part V); Deborah Rhode, The Subtle Side of Sexism, 16 COLUM. J. GEN-
DER & L. 613, 621 (2007) [hereinafter Rhode, Subtle].
16. See Heilman, supra note 15, at 126–27; see also, Rudman & Phelan, supra note 14, at
64–65. Researchers have documented the existence of personal backlash against women
who violate prescriptive gender stereotypes at work, either by demonstrating agentic quali-
ties (achievement, dominance, autonomy, rationality), or by not demonstrating communal
qualities (concern for others, warmth, deference and emotional sensitivity).
17. See e.g., Hilary Sommerlad, Researching and Theorizing the Processes of Professional Iden-
tity Formation 34 J. L. & SOC’Y 190 (2007); Constance Backhouse, Gender and Race in the
Construction of “Legal Professionalism”: Historical Perspective, in IN SEARCH OF THE ETHICAL LAW-
YER: STORIES FROM THE CANADIAN LEGAL PROFESSION 1, 126–49 (Adam Dodek & Alice Wool-
ley eds., 2016).
18. Jonathan Kay, A Role Model Leaves the White House, THE WALRUS (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://thewalrus.ca/a-role-model-leaves-the-white-house/ [https://perma.cc/WWU2-
XEEG]
And yet in the hive mind of right-wing culture warriors—including those here in Ca-
nada—this truth is completely reversed: They invented a completely fictional Obama who
was an unhinged race activist, a terrorist sympathizer, an anti-Semite, a Kenyan-born Sharia
stooge, and a Saul Alinksy acolyte plotting to destroy American capitalism. The myth of this
Bizzaro Obama has persisted even as Actual Obama has been playing the role of national
father figure and patient turn-the-other-cheek Christian role model.
19. Further, this paper generally treats women lawyers who work in law, and women
lawyers who work in politics, as equivalent for the purposes of the analysis, although we do
not consider women politicians other than those who are also lawyers. In our view, the
arguments we make here apply to women politicians as much as to women lawyers. The
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Part II examines the challenges faced by women in law, and in
particular the evidence that women’s success in law has been stunted
and appears to be slipping in relation to other professions. It notes
the explanations generally offered for failures of gender diversity, the
extent to which those explanations have not sufficiently accounted for
the specific struggles of women in the legal profession, and for the
personal attacks and gendered commentary experienced by women
lawyers.20 It discusses some of the particular instances of attacks on
women lawyers that underlie the premise of this paper. It also re-
sponds to likely objections to it, namely, that the attacks we note oc-
curred because of the flaws or attributes of those particular women
subject to them, not because of the role they occupy; or, conversely,
that such attacks will be inflicted on any women in power, not just
women lawyers, such that the woman’s professional role is not espe-
cially relevant.21
Part III briefly discusses the general problem of lawyer unpopu-
larity, considering both its nature and various explanations offered for
it. It notes in particular the connection drawn by several commenta-
tors between lawyer unpopularity and the normative structure of the
lawyer’s role.
Part IV turns to the normative structure of the lawyer’s role, argu-
ing that the best accounts of the lawyer’s role—those rooted in positiv-
ism—necessarily create morally doubtful conduct by lawyers. It argues
lawyer’s function in achieving the social settlement of law flows from politics—it is politics
from which laws that settle our moral disagreements are created. Both lawyers and politi-
cians participate in the moral settlement that legality reflects and, as a consequence, both
lawyers and politicians must comply with masculine gender stereotypes and subvert femi-
nine gender stereotypes. And just as we argue that doing so is perceived as morally trans-
gressive for women lawyers, so too we would argue it is seen that way for women politicians,
which explains the nature of the attacks and criticisms directed at individuals in both
groups. We do not analyze women politicians who are not lawyers only because our pri-
mary focus is on women lawyers in general, not women in politics.
20. Although there is interesting sociological literature on the significance of mascu-
line narratives in constructing and constraining the experience of women and ‘others’ in
law, Hilary Sommerlad has suggested, that for women to truly succeed in law requires a
“total overhaul of the male professional paradigm on which this culture is based, and sec-
ondly of the wider social and economic structures on which it is predicated.” Hilary Som-
merlad, The myth of feminisation: women and cultural change in the legal profession, 1 INT’L J. OF
THE LEGAL PROF. 31, 48 (1994). See generally Margaret Thornton, Authority and Corporeality:
The Conundrum for Women in Law, 6 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 147 (1998); Richard Collier,
Masculinities, Law, and Personal Life: Towards a New Framework for Understanding Men, Law,
and Gender, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 431 (2010).
21. It addresses also the objection that Hillary Clinton’s experiences are not exper-
iences of a women lawyer, even though she is a woman and a lawyer—i.e., that her exper-
iences arise from her position of power and in politics.
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that under a modified positivist account, lawyers must take positions
contrary to the interests of others and the community as a whole, and
will from time to time participate in the infliction of harm. Her con-
duct will injure communal and other interests. As a consequence,
moral ambiguity and morally problematic behavior is a defining fea-
ture of the lawyer’s role, not a failure in the lawyer to satisfy that role.
Part V elaborates the paper’s thesis, that the gendered criticism
and commentary that women face, arises from the intersection be-
tween prescriptive gender stereotypes and the role that law requires
them to occupy. Prescriptive gender stereotypes require women to
demonstrate communal values (concern for others, warmth and col-
laboration, deference, and emotional sensitivity) and to avoid agentic
values (achievement-orientation, assertiveness, autonomy, and ration-
ality). Occupying the lawyer’s role makes that impossible—a lawyer
must demonstrate agentic behavior and is often precluded from dem-
onstrating communal behavior. The hostility directed at women law-
yers arises from the combination of their gender and their role, rather
than simply reflecting either general social misogyny or the traditional
male dominance of the legal profession.
It further considers the implications of this argument, suggesting
that it may account in part for issues of gender diversity that the pro-
fession has been unable to overcome. It rebuts the proposition that
changing the normative structure of the lawyer’s role could reduce
the problem for women lawyers. The role of a lawyer under those al-
ternative normative structures requires similar—or even more signifi-
cant—violations of prescriptive gender stereotypes, such that a woman
who occupied them would have the same problems that she does now.
This part also argues that because the source of the specific and
gendered view of women lawyers arises from the role of being a lawyer
itself, none of the strategies women are encouraged to adopt to avoid
“negative impressions” due to their gender are likely to be success-
ful.22 If the criticisms arise by virtue of being a woman and a lawyer,
then she risks this kind of criticism simply by virtue of her role and
her occupation of it, and no demeanor, style of dress, or placating
attitude can eliminate it.
Ultimately, we offer no particular solutions. In our view, absent
significant social change, women lawyers will remain susceptible to
these kinds of attacks, particularly given the role of social media and
22. Kourtney L. James, Gillian A. Hobson & Paul W. Hinton, Life in a Big Firm, in THE
WOMAN ADVOCATE 131, 142 (Abbe F. Fletman & Evelyn R. Storch eds., 2010).
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the acceptance of vicious personal attacks and negativity in public dis-
course. This threatens the legal profession’s ambition for diversity,
and undermines its ability to maintain the rule of law. Not because
women have some unique perspective on what legality requires or
ought to be, or some unique moral perspective of value. Rather, it
undermines the lawyer’s ability to maintain the rule of law because the
lawyer’s role itself ends up undermining equality and respect for
human dignity—the core values that the rule of law and lawyers are
designed to protect.
We hope that, by pointing out the link between the attack and
the role we can make these attacks easier for women to bear and we
can try to avoid participating in those attacks—even where we ‘don’t
much like’ that woman lawyer. Most of all, we hope that by bringing
awareness to how we evaluate women in the law, we can identify the
attacks for what they are—a consequence of a socially necessary role a
woman has chosen to occupy, rather than as a consequence of the
particular woman’s aggression, incompetence, immorality, sluttiness,
or nastiness.
Gender Diversity and Inequality in the Legal Profession
Women participate and succeed in the legal profession to a re-
markable extent, particularly in light of the fact that, during the life-
time of living women lawyers and judges, obtaining admission to the
profession “could be a feat of endurance.”23 Close to 50% of law stu-
dents are women, and have been for over two decades.24 Women have
achieved the highest levels of success in law and the judiciary, with
three women sitting on the Supreme Court of the United States and
four women sitting on the nine-member Supreme Court of Canada.
Also, it is “well documented that women have made strides in ob-
taining high-level positions in the public and private sectors” in law.25
At the same time, data and trends suggest that gender equality
within the profession remains elusive and has slipped in recent years.
As a percentage, fewer women enroll in law school today than they did
23. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in the Legal Profession at the Turn of the Twenty-First
Century: Assessing Glass Ceilings and Open Doors, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 733, 733 (2001).
24. Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, Navigating the Gap: Reflections on 20 Years
Researching Gender Disparities in the Legal Profession, 8 FIU L. REV. 515, 516 (2013).
25. Jason P. Nance & Paul E. Madsen, An Empirical Analysis of Diversity in the Legal
Profession, 47 CONN. L. REV. 271, 283 (2014). See also, Deborah L. Rhode, Women and the
Path to Leadership, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1439, 1448 (noting that “96% of Americans feel
comfortable with female heads of law firms, 86% feel similarly about a Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and 74% about the presidency”) [hereinafter Rhode, Path].
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in 1993.26 Women remain a small minority of equity partners in large
law firms—fifteen percent—and that number has not meaningfully
changed in many years, despite the fact that half of the associates
hired by those firms are women.27 Women leave firms more often
and, even if they stay, are less likely to be made partner, even when
“controlling for other factors including law school grades and time
out of the work force or part-time schedules.”28 Women earn less than
their male counterparts with the typical female equity partner in a law
firm earning 80% of the typical male equity partner.29 Women are
also under-represented as general counsel of Fortune 500 corpora-
tions and law school deans.30 Data from the American Bar Association
suggests that the legal profession has less diversity than other prestigi-
ous professions, including accounting and medicine.31 One recent
study determined that, after controlling for age and other historically
distorting factors, law now performs worse than other prestigious pro-
fessions in terms of gender equity. The study noted that “women have
been well represented in the legal profession until recently, when they
appear to have become slightly underrepresented” relative to other
prestigious professions.32
Women lawyers also appear to be subject to gendered forms of
criticism as seen when they appear in public roles, particularly those
roles that involve challenging norms or standards, like advocates or
politicians, or when they involve seeking power.33 To illustrate, after
shifting the focus of her attention to safer ground as First Lady,
Michelle Obama has become a beloved public figure. However, dur-
26. Sterling & Reichman, supra note 24, at 516. In 1993 more than 50% of students
enrolled in law schools were women; in 2011 it was 46.8%.
27. Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and
the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2251 (2010).
28. Rhode, Path, supra note 25, at 1448; Wald, supra note 27, at 2255–56.
29. Lauren Stiller Rikleen, Women Lawyers Continue to Lag Behind Male Colleagues: Report
of the Ninth Annual NAWL National Survey on Retention and Promotion Of Women In Law Firms,
NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.nawl.org/p/cm/ld/fid=506
[https://perma.cc/P8YV-33ZS]; see generally Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and the Profession:
The No-Problem Problem, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1001, 1002–03 (2002) [hereinafter Rhode, No-
Problem Problem]; Hilary Sommerlad, Women solicitors in a fractured profession: intersections of
gender and professionalism in England and Wales, 9 INT’L. J. LEGAL PROF. 213, 216 (2002).
30. Rhode, Diversity, supra note 12, at 872.
31. Id. at 871.
32. Nance & Madsen, supra note 25, at 319. For data on the exclusion of women in
prestigious and powerful positions, see Sommerlad, supra note 29, at 216–17.
33. Sady Doyle, America loves women like Hillary Clinton as long as they’re not asking for a
promotion, QUARTZ (Feb. 25, 2016), https://qz.com/624346/america-loves-women-like-hil
lary-clinton-as-long-as-theyre-not-asking-for-a-promotion/ [https://perma.cc/Q94U-NC2
X].
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ing President Obama’s 2008 campaign, when she criticized America’s
history on matters of race she “was labeled by her critics as angry, bit-
ter and militant.”34 Similarly, harsh criticism and media coverage of
Marcia Clark during the trial of OJ Simpson has been recently criti-
qued as reflecting double standards and sexism,35 an assessment that a
review of contemporaneous records makes difficult to refute. A 1997
article in Britain’s The Independent noted:
In the trial, one never knew which Marcia one was getting. She was
by turns silky and flinty, playful and schoolmarmish, but plainly
never one to suffer fools gladly. She is fortyish and not especially
attractive. Johnnie Cochran, with his instinct for a weak spot, called
her “hysterical.”36
Gloria Allred, a Los Angeles attorney specializing in notorious
cases of women who allege mistreatment by famous men, is regularly
labeled a “fame-whore.”37 Googling “Gloria Allred bitch” generates an
impressive list of blogs and commentaries stating the same.38 Janet
Reno’s recent death generated many admiring eulogistic articles, and
during her time as Attorney General she enjoyed significant positive
press. However, during the fall-out over the disastrous FBI assault on
the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, the media criticized
her personal demeanor, seeing her as “abrasive,” “cool . . . to the
point of iciness,” and “testy under questioning.”39
34. Kate Dailey, Michelle Obama: Her four-year evolution, BBC NEWS (Sept. 4, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19431000 [https://perma.cc/XZ32-TFHC]. For
Michelle Obama, issues of race obviously also factor in to how she is discussed, although in
this instance we see gender as a significant component. Other attacks on her have been
purely racist. See, e.g., Kristine Guerra, The nonprofit director who called Michelle Obama an ‘ape
in heels’ has lost her job—for good, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/12/27/the-nonprofit-director-who-
called-mich [https://perma.cc/A7WL-YDEY].
35. Traister, supra note 10.
36. Cornwell, supra note 3. There were also issues in relation to how she was treated
by the judge. In a 2016 interview, Clark said “He treated me like a second-class citizen, and
a jury takes their cue from the judge.” Celia Walden, O.J. Simpson prosecutor: ‘His murder trial
ruined my life—but 20 years on I’m back’, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 18, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk /women/work/oj-simpson-prosecutor-his-murder-trial-ruined-my-
life—-but-20-y/ [https://perma.cc/HPG2-D63Q].
37. Even in relatively flattering articles: Dodai Stewart, Attention-Loving Lawyer Gloria
Allred is More than Just a Fame-Whore, JEZEBEL (Oct. 15, 2007, 7:00 PM), http://jezebel.com/
311069 /attention-loving-lawyer-gloria-allred-is-more-than-just-a-fame-whore [https://
perma.cc/92HE-C4MZ].
38. Top search results, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/#q=Gloria+Allred+Bitch&
(search “Gloria Allred bitch;” the first results of the search are “I Fucking Hate Gloria
Allred,” followed by “Chick fight: Megyn Kelly bitch slaps Gloria Allred”) (last visited Feb.
28, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7UQR-XP45].
39. Howard Kurtz, Janet Reno, Hung Out to Dry? How the Media Put Her Through the Spin
Cycle, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 1993), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/
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The most remarkable criticisms have, however, been reserved for
Hillary Clinton. Considering only her career up to 2008, it is not diffi-
cult to find comments and criticisms apt for a sexism playbook:
It’s not that [Hillary Clinton]’s an accomplished modern woman.
It’s just that she’s grating, abrasive and boastful. There’s a certain
familiar order of things, and the notion of a coequal couple in the
White House is a little offensive to men and women.40
[Hillary Clinton] is a bitch . . . [t]hat’s the only thing [Newt] ever
said about her.41
Rush Limbaugh called Clinton the woman with the “testicle lock
box” and MSNBC commentator Tucker Carlson stated that
“[t]here’s just something about her that feels castrating, overbear-
ing and scary,” and, on another article, he stated that “when she
comes on television, I involuntarily cross my legs.” Finally, radio
talk show host Don Imus has often referred to Clinton as “that
buck tooth witch Satan” and Bill Clinton’s “fat, ugly wife, Satan.”42
After her 2007 victory in the New Hampshire primary, when she
said “This is very personal for me. It’s not just political. It’s not just
public,” Senator Clinton was ridiculed by political commentators
who argued that “[s]he pretended to cry, the women felt sorry for
her . . . and asked whether Hillary [could] cry her way back to the
White House.”43
Hillary Clinton has been subject to even more vitriolic descrip-
tions: “power-hungry,” “castrating,” “Hitlerian,” and “feminazi.”
During her presidential campaign [in 2008] she coped with sales
of a Clinton nutcracker, charges that she reminded men of a scold-
ing mother or first wife, and hecklers with signs demanding “Iron
my shirt.”44
Those types of criticisms did not abate in the recent campaign. As
Rebecca Solnit recently summarized:
1993/12 /21/janet-reno-hung-out-to-dry-how-the-media-put-her-through-the-spin-cycle/
[https://perma.cc/3CSH-LW4Q].
40. Maureen Dowd, The 1992 Campaign: Candidate’s Wife; Hillary Clinton as Aspiring
First Lady: Role Model, or a ‘Hall Monitor’ Type, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 1992), http://
www.nytimes.com/1992 /05/18/us/1992-campaign-candidate-s-wife-hillary-clinton-aspir-
ing-first-lady-role-model.html (quoting Roger Stone, a Republican consultant) [https://
perma.cc/PG2Y-NVBR].
41. Tamayo, supra note 2, at 284 (quoting a 1995 interview with Newt Gingrich’s
mother Kathleen).
42. Id. at 285–86.
43. Id. at 299.
44. Rhode, Diversity, supra note 12. Full Frontal with Samantha Bee, Let Hillary be Hil-
lary, YOUTUBE (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6zf5VkuiEQ [https://
perma.cc/G6S9-YHMW].
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Clinton was constantly berated for qualities rarely mentioned in
male politicians, including ambition—something, it’s safe to as-
sume, she has in common with everyone who ever ran for elected
office. It’s possible, according to Psychology Today’s headline, that
she is ‘pathologically ambitious.’ She was criticized for having a
voice. While Bernie Sanders railed and Trump screamed and snick-
ered, the Fox commentator Brit Hume complained about Clin-
ton’s ‘sharp, lecturing tone,’ which, he said, was ‘not so attractive,’
while MSNBC’s Lawrence O’Donnell gave her public instructions
on how to use a microphone, Bob Woodward bitched that she was
‘screaming’ and Bob Cusack, the editor of the political newspaper
The Hill, said: “When Hillary Clinton raises her voice, she loses.”45
In that campaign President Trump paid particular attention to
work Clinton had done when she was in legal practice, bringing the
alleged victim of a man she had represented to the second presiden-
tial debate:
One of the women, who is a wonderful woman, at 12 years old, was
raped at 12. . . . Her client she represented got him off, and she’s
seen laughing on two separate occasions, laughing at the girl who
was raped. Kathy Shelton, that young woman is here with us
tonight.46
Even women lawyers who receive relatively positive press are
often described in highly gendered ways. Hannah Brenner and Renee
Newman Knake observe in a media study that women nominees to the
Supreme Court tend to have their appearance and family life com-
mented on somewhat more than do male nominees.47 Well-known ce-
lebrity divorce lawyer Laura Wasser is noted for her clothes and
appearance and was described in a 2016 Financial Times article as
having “a ready smile and lustrous brown hair reaching down her
back.” The Financial Times noted TMZ’s descriptions of her as “super
hot” and “the hottest attorney chick I have ever seen.”48 Coverage of
45. Solnit, supra note 12.
46. Aaron Blake, Donald Trumps attack on Hillary Clinton for defending an accused child
rapist, explained, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2016/10/09/why-donald-trump-just-attacked-hillary-clinton-for-defending-an-ac
cused-child-rapist-explained/?utm_term=.0a64c78692b2 [https://perma.cc/P248-6NQW].
47. Hannah Brenner & Renee Newman Knake, Rethinking Gender Equality in the Legal
Profession’s Pipeline to Power: A Study on Media Coverage of Supreme Court Nominees (Phase 1, the
Introduction Week), 84 TEMP. L. REV. 325, 331–32 (2012) (noting that more data is needed).
As a related point, it is worth noting that models of lawyer behavior—whether positive or
negative—are articulated in highly masculine form, of male violence or virtue. See Amy
Salyzyn, John Rambo v. Atticus Finch: Gender, Diversity and the Civility Movement, 16 LEGAL
ETHICS 97, 97–118 (2013); see also Jonnette Watson-Hamilton, Metaphors of Lawyers’ Profes-
sionalism, 33 ALTA. L. REV. 833 (1995).
48. Gary Silverman, Laura Wasser, Hollywood lawyer born to the business, FIN. TIMES (Sept.
23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/4e4318f2-8113-11e6-8e50-8ec15fb462f4 [https://
perma.cc/6FKK-6AAM].
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whistleblower Jesselyn Radack routinely discusses her family and her
appearance—her matching nail polish, her “unruly blonde hair” and
her “calf-high leather boots.”49 Media coverage of well-known Cana-
dian criminal defense lawyer Marie Henein fixates on her clothes and
looks, describing how she “sweep[s] past in a stunning black dress and
designer jacket,” with a “slash of scarlet lipstick” and “patent stilet-
tos.”50 Henein, however, has been criticized as “not a feminist” for her
successful defense of accused rapists.51
Implicit in the discussion of these examples are two claims. First,
that these examples reflect sexism and misogyny, as opposed to being
justified criticisms of problematic conduct. Second, that these exam-
ples relate to the fact that the women are lawyers, rather than simply
being sexist attacks directed at women who achieve positions of prom-
inence or power. Both of these claims can be challenged; for every
2016 article suggesting that Hillary Clinton faced sexism in her cam-
paign for president is another article suggesting that her defeat was
unrelated to sexism or misogyny.52 Many of the women we note could
be legitimately criticized for aspects of their professional choices. Fur-
ther, critics could quickly identify women outside of law and politics
49. A 2004 Mother Jones article discusses Radack’s “tall, handsome husband” and her
“two young sons.” It goes on to say in evidencing that she is not “weird, in the cliche´d,
whistleblower-as-misfit sense,” that her “fingernails and toenails match (deep mauve); her
kinky hair (though she often dries it straight) is cinched in a ponytail, her eyebrows lightly
plucked.” Laurie Abraham, Anatomy of a Whistleblower, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 2004), http://
www.motherjones.com /politics/2004/01/anatomy-whistleblower [https://perma.cc/
243W-BH52]. A 2014 article about her representation of Edward Snowden discussed her
“black dress and unruly blonde hair,” noting her “calf-high leather boots” and how she
later “trades her boots for a pair of pink New Balance sneakers.” Russell Brandom, Edward
Snowden’s Lawyer Will Keep your Secrets: Jesselyn Radack is a whistleblower’s best defense, THE
VERGE (June 24, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/6/24/5818594/ed
ward-snowdens-lawyer-jesselyn-radack-will-keep-your-secrets [https://perma.cc/EUQ3-
L238].
50. Marci McDonald, The Fixer, TORONTO LIFE (Oct. 20, 2015), http://torontolife.com
/city/crime/marie-henein-jian-ghomeshi-lawyer/ [https://perma.cc/8XMY-XRDN]; see
also Anne Kingston, The Ghomeshi trial’s one taboo: Marie Henein’s shoes, MACLEANS (Jan. 9,
2015), http://www.macleans.ca/culture/the-ghomeshi-trials-one-taboo-marie-heneins-
shoes/ [https://perma.cc/J6KG-M37N].
51. Murphy, supra note 5.
52. See, e.g., Nancy L. Cohen, Sexism did not cost Hillary Clinton the election, WASH. POST
(Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/16/sex
ism-did-not-cost-hillary-clinton-the-election/?utm_term=.Aae205047d12 [https://
perma.cc/JQ67-HJAD]; Rex Murphy, It wasn’t misogyny that caused Clinton’s downfall, it was
all the baggage she dragged around, NAT’L POST (Nov. 11, 2016), http://news.nationalpost.
com/full-comment/rex-murphy-fear-and-loathing-on-the-campaign-trail-16 [https://
perma.cc/9JSA-5K6J].
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that have faced similar attacks, such as Megyn Kelly53 and the women
of Gamergate.54 It is also possible to argue that the attacks on Hillary
Clinton do not relate to the fact that she is a lawyer; that she is one is
coincidental, not causative.
With respect to the first challenge, our claim is not that sexist
criticism and attacks on women never reflect legitimate grounds of
moral or political disagreement. Rather, our assertion is that the tone,
intensity, certainty, and nature of the criticisms directed at these wo-
men go beyond any claimed substantive justification. In essence, if a
woman behaved in exactly the same way as a man, any criticism lev-
eled at her in tone and substance sounds very different—our criti-
cisms of that woman can be characterized as sexist, and in some cases,
misogynistic. We cannot prove that assertion; it flows from what we see
when we consider the examples here and our personal experiences.
To us, labeling Michelle Obama angry and bitter because she notes
the existence of racism was both sexist and racist. Shifting attacks of
Janet Reno from what she did in handling the Waco incident to em-
phasize her personal abrasiveness and coolness reflects traditional ste-
reotypes employed against women in leadership roles. Critiquing
Marcia Clark for her clothes, demeanor, and her “likability” reflects
classic negative gender stereotypes. Gloria Allred’s undoubted appre-
ciation of media attention would be labeled differently if she were
male—as suggested by comparing commentary about her to the dis-
cussion of lawyers such as Jim “The Hammer” Shapiro, one of the
more notorious creators of aggressive lawyer advertising, who is criti-
cized but not castigated.55
53. Laura Bates, Donald Trump’s ‘Spat’ with Megyn Kelly is Sexism, and It’s Abusive, TIME
(Jan. 28, 2016), http://time.com/4198737/donald-trump-megyn-kelly-sexism/ [https://
perma.cc/584P-BFE7].
54. See Jay Hathaway, What is Gamergate, and Why? An Explainer for Non-Geeks, GAWKER
(Oct. 10, 2014), http://gawker.com/what-is-gamergate-and-why-an-explainer-for-non-
geeks-1642909080 [https://perma.cc/38XM-6T6N].
55. Robyn Pennacchia, 8 crazy lawyer commercials that will haunt your dreams, DEA-
THANDTAXESMAG.COM (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.deathandtaxesmag.com/197706/8-
crazy-lawyer-commercials-that-will-haunt-your-dreams/ [https://perma.cc/K4VQ-NT7M].
Jim “The Hammer” Shapiro creates notorious lawyer advertisements, many of which go
viral. Certainly, coverage of those ads are not positive, but it tends to be lighthearted and,
when critical, it is directed at lawyers generally rather than at Jim Shapiro personally. Top
search results, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=SSl#q=Jim™he+ammer+Sha-
piro+asshole (the search “Jim the hammer Shapiro asshole” did not generate any notable
hits) (last visited Apr. 9, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CD3L-QSAX]; Top search results,
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=SSl#q=Jim™he+ammer+Shapiro£astard
(search “Jim the hammer Shapiro bastard” mostly generated links to Shapiro’s book Sue the
Bastards!! Your Guide to Huge Cash) (last visited Apr. 9, 2017) [https://perma.cc/HA7F-
ZCQ3].
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The attacks on Hillary Clinton are in our view overtly and inde-
fensibly misogynistic, and have been since she first entered public life.
Even positive coverage of women lawyers that focuses on their appear-
ance, clothes, and “hotness” belittles the professional capacity and ac-
complishments of those women and may set them up for future
criticism. The woman who is sophisticated, well-dressed and attractive
today, may become a self-promoting harlot if her legal work makes
her more susceptible to criticism.56
We believe that all women lawyers, whether famous or not, are
susceptible to sexist attacks and criticisms of this type—even without
the notoriety of the women we have used as examples here.57 If some-
one sees something different, we have no argument or tools to per-
suade him or her that our perception is the correct one. Our
argument is, simply, if what we see is what is there, then why does that
occur and what does it mean?
In relation to the second challenge, we acknowledge that women
outside of law also experience sexist and misogynist attacks and criti-
cism. We do not, however, think that means that the attacks and criti-
cism of women in law are unrelated to their role. Professions other
than law can be unpopular, but we still understand the unpopularity
of lawyers in light of the work they do. Sexist attacks are inflicted on a
range of women, but it is still worth considering why women lawyers
experience them.
Importantly, women lawyers suffer such critiques due to the mor-
ally ambiguous and problematic nature of the lawyer’s role—the role
requires women to challenge or subvert accepted moral and social
norms and, consequently, to violate prescriptive gendered stereotypes,
making women lawyers susceptible to personal and sexist attacks.
When women outside of law are attacked for challenging or sub-
verting accepted moral and social norms, the criticisms support our
thesis rather than challenge it—the reason for the attacks is in sub-
stance the same as the reason we suggest leads to such attacks on wo-
men lawyers. For example, Madonna is not a lawyer, but she has
continually challenged conventional moral norms and standards, and
exhibited ambition and agency over her own life. The “constant bully-
56. While she was attacked as an anti-feminist, the criticisms of Marie Henein may
have been ameliorated to some extent by what turned out to be the extraordinary weak-
ness of the case against her client. Had the case been stronger, but an acquittal nonethe-
less obtained, the attacks on her may well have been more vicious, particularly in relation
to her personal style and appearance.
57. Both of us have some experience of this.
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ing and relentless abuse” inflicted on her as a consequence is, in our
view, a different iteration of the phenomenon we describe here.58
With respect to Hillary Clinton, we concede that she is an imper-
fect example of the phenomenon we discuss insofar as she has not
been in active legal practice since the early 1990s. However, we believe
that she remains relevant for our analysis. Notably, attacks on her have
been directly connected to her professional work and status as a law-
yer, both when she first came into the public eye59 and during the last
presidential campaign. As noted earlier, her defense of a man accused
of sexual assault was explicitly invoked as one of the reasons to view
her with suspicion and distrust. Additionally, and more importantly,
many of the arguments that we make apply to women in politics be-
cause law and politics are closely analogous.
As discussed below, the issues for women lawyers arise in signifi-
cant part because of the role lawyers play in relation to achieving the
social settlement of moral and political disagreements in law. Politi-
cians also work to create that social settlement—indeed, politics is
law’s source; law is a product of politics.
To the extent that hostility towards women lawyers arises from
their role, women politicians are likely to have similar problems. The
attacks leveled at Hillary Clinton arise, therefore, from a position
closely analogous to the lawyer’s role and from her status as a lawyer.
For that reason, we maintain her relevance to our analysis. Further-
more, considering Hillary Clinton’s experiences is important, because
it suggests how bad these sorts of attacks can get. Her experiences
demonstrate just how vilified a woman lawyer can be.
Gender inequality in the legal profession is evidenced by genera-
lized data indicating that women have decreased participation in the
profession and lower levels of accomplishment than men, and by the
common personal and sexist criticisms experiences by successful wo-
men lawyers. We are neither the first people to note this inequality
nor the first people to consider explanations for it. Generally speak-
ing, scholars observing and explaining gender inequality in the legal
58. Eli Rosenberg, ‘To Age Is a Sin’: In Blunt Speech, Madonna Confronts Bias in Various
Forms, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/arts/music/ma
donna-billboard-awards-speech-ageism-sexism.html [https://perma.cc/MZF6-L5JC].
59. For example, the criticisms related to her carrying on as a lawyer while Bill Clin-
ton was Governor of Arkansas, and the potential for conflicts of interest, which led to her
(in)famous response “I suppose I could have stayed home, baked cookies and had teas.”
Denver Nicks, This Was the Hillary Clinton Comment That Sparked Lena Dunham’s Political
Awareness, TIME (Sept. 29, 2015), http://time.com/4054623/clinton-dunham-tea-cookies/
[https://perma.cc/5S3Q-D9U8].
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profession have emphasized the role of negative gender stereotypes
and implicit bias,60 the absence of mentoring and networking oppor-
tunities for women,61 and the structure and function of law firms.62
The issue with these general explanations of gender inequality in
the legal profession, however, is that they largely tend to assume that
law is like any other prestigious and male-dominated profession.63
Other than noting some issues related to private law firms, they do not
identify whether, or why, the legal profession might present unique
and more intractable issues for women.64 An absence of mentoring
and networking opportunities for women would be an issue in any
male dominated field. Stereotypes related to female incompetence,
women’s lack of commitment to professional life, and that women
“are rated lower when they adopt authoritative, seemingly masculine
styles” could inhibit the professional advancement of women account-
ants, doctors and engineers just as much as they could undermine
women lawyers.65 That is not to say that those explanations are not
important or relevant, and some of them will be useful to our analysis,
but they do not account for the lag in equality experienced by the
legal profession in particular.
In addition, scholars writing about women in the legal profession
tend to focus primarily on opportunities for women’s advancement in
the profession and in legal organizations, rather than considering the
60. See, e.g., Rhode, No-Problem Problem, supra note 29, at 1004–05; Rhode, Subtle, supra
note 15; Nicole E. Negowetti, Implicit Bias and the Legal Profession’s ‘Diversity Crisis’: A Call for
Self-Reflection, 15 NEV. L.J. 930 (2015); Peggy Li, Physical Attractiveness and Femininity: Helpful
or Hurtful for Female Attorney, 47 AKRON L. REV. 997 (2015).
61. Rhode, No-Problem Problem, supra note 29, at 1004–05; Rhode, Path, supra note 25.
62. Id.; see also Ann C. McGinley, Masculine Law Firms, 8 FIU L. REV. 423 (2013).
63. This is not true of sociological analysis that considers the intersection between the
law, professional identity and ideals or concepts of masculinity and femininity. See, e.g.,
Sommerlad and Backhouse, supra note 17, and comments, supra note 20 (specifically, the
papers referenced). Our analysis links in concept and outcome to sociological analysis of
law and the legal profession, although methodologically distinct in relying on the intersec-
tion between philosophical analysis of the lawyer’s role and psychological studies and ob-
servations of human behavior, rather than considering the construction of norms and
behavior through social and cultural forces.
64. In their terrific analysis of trends on diversity in the legal profession, after showing
that women have moved to being slightly underrepresented in law in relation to other
professions, Nance and Madsen suggest that the difference may arise from the fact that law
firms are not “just and inclusive” and that women are not as satisfied as men with their
professional lives. However, that answer is relatively unsatisfactory. Large corporate law
firms represent a relatively small portion of the legal profession, and the trends that they
identify seem to go well beyond the law firm. See Nance & Madsen, supra note 25.
65. Rhode, Diversity, supra note 12, at 879.
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hostility or criticism that women lawyers may face.66 Although this dif-
ference is not noted, these scholars tend to focus on descriptive ste-
reotypes about women’s capabilities, not prescriptive stereotypes
about appropriate behavior for women. The criticism faced by women
lawyers relates to issues of lawyer advancement, as we will note below,
but it is a distinct question, and it requires consideration of prescrip-
tive and descriptive gender stereotypes. If gender stereotyping ac-
counts for the attacks directed at women, it seems likely to be because
women have violated stereotypes about how they ought to behave,
rather than because they have defied stereotypes about how they will
behave.
Eli Wald addresses some of these gaps in his compelling assess-
ment of the reasons for the failure of women to advance in large law
firms. Wald argues that modern law firms have adopted a “hypercom-
petitive ideology” in which law firms emphasize total commitment to
clients and client service, and the elite status of the firms depend on
portraying “lawyers as near-heroic servants, zealous service providers
who pursue the interests of their clients around the clock.”67 Wald
argues that the combination of hypercompetitive ideology with nega-
tive descriptive stereotypes about women as insufficiently committed
to their professional lives, has made large law firms incompatible with
the retention and success of women attorneys.68
Wald’s argument is compelling. While it relies on many of the
insights of other scholars about the nature and significance of gender
stereotyping, it illuminates the particular issues for women in large
law firms. Women in large firms do not have problems simply because
they are women in a male-dominated profession; they have problems
because they are women working in a hypercompetitive law firm,
where gender stereotypes about women create unique barriers to ad-
vancement.69 Wald focuses on descriptive gender stereotypes, but his
explanation highlights the issues arising for women specific to an as-
pect of legal practice.70
Further, Wald’s thesis indicates the type of explanation likely to
be useful to address the challenges faced generally by women in law,
and the personal and sexist attacks that women lawyers may face. In
66. Although, this question is clearly considered by some. See, e.g., Tamoyo, supra note
2; Kathleen Bergin, Sexualized Advocacy: The Ascendant Backlash Against Female Lawyers, 18
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 191 (2006).
67. Wald, supra note 27, at 2271.
68. Id. at 2279–86.
69. Id.
70. See generally id.
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his analysis of descriptive gender stereotypes about the nature of wo-
men’s abilities and capacities, Wald demonstrates that the gendered
issues for women in law firms arise at the intersection between the
firm’s norms and negative gender stereotypes.71 Assuming that issues
for women in law arise in a manner similar to the issues Wald identi-
fies for women in large law firms, their source is likely to be the inter-
section between norms and values of legal practice and negative
gender stereotypes. Our analysis of the relevant gender stereotypes
will include prescriptive gender stereotypes about what women ought
to do or be, rather than descriptive gender stereotypes about what
women are capable of doing or being.72 Wald’s example takes us to
the key question: How might the intersection of the norms underlying
the practice of law with negative gender stereotypes give rise to per-
sonal, hostile, and sexist attacks on women lawyers?
The Unpopularity of Lawyers
To answer that question it is worth briefly considering the general
issue of lawyer unpopularity. The question of why and in what way
society dislikes lawyers may have some relevance for the question of
why critics direct gendered and hostile criticism at particular women
lawyers. Lawyer unpopularity can seem hostile; even when framed as a
“joke.” Lawyers are characterized as devious, money obsessed, con-
temptible, incomprehensible, useless, and self-satisfied.73
Academics who have considered this issue generally identify one
of two causes. Some see the unpopularity of lawyers as reflecting genu-
ine grievances with the unethical and immoral conduct of lawyers: “a
significant segment of the bar routinely and patently pads bills and
defrauds clients” while the rest maintain “silence in the face of open
and endemic fraud.”74
The problem with this explanation, however, is that it does not
account for the form that lawyer unpopularity takes. Lawyers are un-
popular, but not uniformly or simplistically so. Even though lawyers,
as a class of professionals, are often the butt of jokes, the work they do
is also seen as valuable. The general public criticizes lawyers for doing
work for clients at the public expense, but also values putting client
interests first and protecting people’s rights.75 Further, people who
71. Id. at 2279–86.
72. Rudman & Phelan, supra note 14.
73. See, e.g., Overton, supra note 6.
74. See Bogus, supra note 6, at 914; see also Overton, supra note 6.
75. Rotunda, supra note 6, at 61.
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retain lawyers tend to report high levels of satisfaction with the work
those lawyers do on their behalf.76 This belies the idea that lawyer
unpopularity arises from lawyer misconduct; if it did, one would ex-
pect lawyers to be unpopular specifically—because of their own bad
acts—rather than generically. One would also not expect the criticism
and praise of lawyers to look much the same. Yet as Robert Post has
noted:
[L]awyers are applauded for following their clients’ wishes and
bending the rules to satisfy those wishes; and they are at the very
same time condemned for using the legal system to satisfy their
clients’ desires by bringing lawsuits at their clients’ behest and us-
ing the legal system to get what their clients want, rather than to
uphold the right and denounce the wrong.77
As Brad Wendel puts it, people view lawyers positively when they
evaluate them from the perspective of a client or potential client, but
when they evaluate lawyers from the perspective of “an affected mem-
ber of the public,” their views are more negative.78
Wendel and others attribute this complex view to the nature of
the lawyer’s role as understood from a positivist perspective—we see
lawyers as dangerous and valuable because lawyers work at the center
of law as a response to the problem of pluralism.79 By working to the
point where we have settled our moral disagreements and created a
social order despite those disagreements, lawyers both enforce con-
sensus views on moral outcomes and allow individuals to achieve re-
sults that some find morally objectionable.80 As explained by Robert
Post:
Lawyers, in other words, bestride the following cultural contradic-
tion: we both want and in some respects have a universal, common
culture, and we simultaneously want that culture to be malleable
and responsive to the particular and often incompatible interests
of individual groups and citizens. We expect lawyers to fulfill both
desires, and so they are a constant irritating reminder that we are
neither a peaceable kingdom of harmony and order, nor a land of
undiluted individual autonomy, but somewhere disorientingly in
between. Lawyers, in the very exercise of their profession, are the
necessary bearers of that bleak winter’s tale, and we hate them for
it.81
76. Wendel, supra note 6, at 1034.
77. Post, supra note 6, at 380.
78. Wendel, supra note 6, at 1034.
79. Id. at 1041.
80. Id. at 1034.
81. Post, supra note 6, at 386.
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This account of lawyer unpopularity has two notable features
from the perspective of our analysis. First, it tends to assume that all
lawyers will be liked or disliked in more or less the same way. The
problem is one for lawyers as a whole, not one experienced to a
greater or lesser extent by different groups of lawyers or individual
lawyers. Second, it posits that individual lawyers will have a better rep-
utation than do lawyers as a group. The distrust and dislike of lawyers
is because of the general work that lawyers do, more than it is the
work of any individual lawyer, but that is not entirely the case. Lawyers
who take on controversial cases will, when assessed from the perspec-
tive of an affected member of the public, plausibly become a focal
point for discontent with the legal profession.82 But the problem of
lawyer unpopularity is generally understood to be a collective problem
more than an individual one.
The discussion from the prior section calls that assumption into
question. It suggests that while lawyers in general may be unpopular
and subject to criticism, women lawyers experience criticism directed
at them that is more frequent as well as being personal, hostile and
gendered. This means that we have to consider something beyond the
standard analysis of lawyer unpopularity. Instead, we need to identify
why women lawyers are both more unpopular and more unpopular in
a personal, hostile and gendered way.
Based on Wald’s observation about women in large law firms, the
most plausible explanation is likely to be that the different sort of un-
popularity experienced by women lawyers arises from the intersection
between the norms of the lawyer’s role with negative gender stereo-
types, and prescriptive gender stereotypes about appropriate conduct
by women. That is, the norms of the lawyer’s role create general yet
complex unpopularity for lawyers as a group; however, the intersec-
tion of that role with prescriptive gender stereotypes creates a specific
and gendered hostility for particular women lawyers.
Considering whether that is the case, however, requires deeper
consideration of the normative basis for the lawyer’s role. What does
being a lawyer require, and how might those requirements conflict
with gendered expectations for appropriate female behavior? The
next section considers the first of those questions: What is the norma-
tive foundation of the lawyer’s role?
82. Which in turn makes it likely that some groups of lawyers, like criminal defense
lawyers, may be more unpopular than lawyers on average.
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The Lawyer’s Role and the Rule of Law
Introduction
Scholars contest the normative foundations of the lawyer’s role.83
This section considers one of those explanations, which connect the
lawyer’s role to the nature and function of legality, understood in a
modified positivist sense.84 It does so because one of us has written
extensively in support of that perspective,85 and more importantly, be-
cause the modified positivist theory connects closely to popular under-
standings of the lawyer’s role and to conventional professional
practices. The modified positivist theory does not uncritically endorse
or adopt the practices of common law lawyers, but, as described be-
low, it does generally endorse the standard conception of the lawyer’s
role.86 That is, the lawyer as a person who advises clients on their legal
rights and entitlements, and advocates for client interests within the
boundaries of legality, and in both cases without assessing or account-
ing for the extra-legal morality of the client’s ends.
In order to link to lawyer unpopularity in general, or the unpopu-
larity of women lawyers in particular, the normative justification needs
to explain what lawyers actually do in practice. Lawyers, either in gen-
eral or women lawyers specifically, are unlikely to be socially unpopu-
lar or criticized because of normatively justified practices none of
them actually do. Thus, it is worth considering the availability of a
normative justification for those practices, and how it might intersect
with negative gender stereotypes to cause the type of specific
gendered criticisms women experience.
The paper will later consider alternative normative justifications
for the lawyer’s role to consider whether shifting current lawyer prac-
tices to be more consistent with those accounts would improve the
circumstances of women lawyers. It will consider whether, for exam-
ple, women lawyers would fare better if lawyers did not allow profes-
sional norms to dominate personal moral obligation. The starting
point, though, is the lawyer whose practices can be normatively justi-
83. See generally, Alice Woolley, The Problem of Disagreement, 26 CAN. J. OF L. & JURIS.
181, 181 (2013).
84. The theory adopted here reflects positivist perspectives on the legitimacy of law as
a democratic compromise to the problem of deep social disagreement, but following Wal-
dron, it incorporates Fuller’s perspective on law as also having a moral structure arising
from its form and process. That is, it claims that the legitimacy of law, and the lawyer’s role,
arise both from the law’s positivist function and from its moral structure.
85. See Alice Woolley, The Lawyer as Fiduciary: Defining Private Law Duties in Public Law
Relations, 65 U. OF TORONTO L. J. 285 (2015).
86. See explanation, supra note 84.
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fied while also connecting to the current practices of common law
lawyers.
Rule by Law
A modified positivist theory of the lawyer’s role justifies that role
in light of the nature and function of legality; lawyers must act as zeal-
ous advocates for client interests within the bounds of legality because
accomplishing rule by law requires that they do so.87
Rule by law is a particular form of social governance. As positivist
legal ethicists emphasize, law allows us to accomplish social coordina-
tion and settlement without violence. We can pursue shared moral
values, and settle moral differences through democratic processes we
recognize as legitimate, and which incorporate respect for the dignity
and equality of the governed.88 The resulting social compromises,
while potentially divergent from the moral values of some—or even
the majority—can claim authority and legitimacy as the product of the
adequately fair procedures of democratically created and constituted
political institutions.89 As described by Brad Wendel:
All citizens have an interest in living together and working on com-
mon projects, and doing so on the basis of rights that others will
accept as legitimate. This means that citizens have an obligation to
one another to act in a way that is respectful of moral pluralism,
which means acknowledging that others may disagree in good faith
about what rights people should have. Citizens comply with this
obligation by acting on legal norms, which have been established
by institutions and procedures entrusted with the responsibility of
settling on a position, in the name of the community as a whole,
regarding what should be done in a particular situation.90
87. Kate Kruse has described this as the “jurisprudential turn” in legal ethics. See Kath-
erine R. Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 493 (2011).
88. See generally, TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD
CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE (Ashgate Publishing Co. ed., 2009); W. BRADLEY
WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 91 (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2010) [hereinafter
LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW]; W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW.
U. L. REV. 1167, 1201 (2005) (discussing a lawyer’s role in objectively interpreting the law
and settling moral differences arising from client conduct); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as
Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L. J. 1060, 1060–61 (1976)
(discussing the “traditional conception of the lawyer’s role and the ideal of moral purity”);
Monroe Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATHOLIC U. L. REV.
191 (1977–78); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986).
89. LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW, supra note 88, at 91; Dare, supra note 88, at 61.
90. LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW, supra note 88, at 107.
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Legality fairly establishes the terms of our interaction and en-
gagement with each other, and in doing so it “has moral value.”91
In addition, as emphasized by Lon Fuller and Nigel Simmonds,
and as more recently linked to positivism by Jeremy Waldron, the
form and process of rule by law allows respect for the dignity and au-
tonomy of the person.92 The form of law, and the process through
which it is applied, ensures respect for the people subject to it. Law’s
form and procedures rest on the premise that people can understand
the world, can control and monitor themselves and their behaviours,
and within the law’s structural constraints, ought to be able to engage
with and shape its meaning and application.93 The law treats “ordi-
nary citizens with respect as active centers of intelligence”94 and not as
objects to be acted upon.95
Specifically, the law assumes voluntary compliance and structures
itself—through clear and consistent rules, capable of being complied
with and which match official action—to permit voluntary compli-
ance.96 Law does not function because officials make people comply
with it; officials have that power but rarely exercise it.97 Rather, the
law functions because of the voluntary and willing compliance of the
citizenry, and it embodies respect for the citizenry by assuming they
will do so.
Further, the law assumes the freedom of individuals to act as they
see fit within the constraints of the law’s rules. In contrast to rule by
fiat or force, the law respects the freedom of each person to choose
91. Id. at 123.
92. NIGEL SIMMONDS, LAW AS A MORAL IDEA 104 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2007); see also
LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 200-24 (Yale Univ. Press ed., 1964) (Fuller conceives of
law-making as being a bilateral relationship between the governed and governing, rejecting
the idea that law can be understood as a “one-way projection of authority” rather than as
interactional); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 99–130 (2007) (the author
provides an excellent explanation of this aspect of Fuller’s theory).
93. Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008) [here-
inafter Waldron, Concept].
94. Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure 20 (NYU Sch. Of
Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 10-73, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1688491 [https://perma.cc/2WGY-UKAP].
95. Waldron, Concept, supra note 93, at 26.
96. FULLER, supra note 92, at 33–94 (sets out the “desiderata” of law); see also Luban,
supra note 92, at 116 (“The burden of understanding and complying with rules falls on
those whom the rules govern; the reciprocal relationship between governors and the gov-
erned places a corresponding burden on the governor to make the rules understood and
capable of being complied with.”); see also id. (dividing Fuller’s desiderata into require-
ments going to clarity, requirements going to ability to comply and requirements which go
to both).
97. Waldron, Concept, supra note 93, at 28.
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how to construct her life within its constraints. Indeed, as suggested by
Nigel Simmonds, it is only rule by law that can ensure that sort of
freedom:
Law represents the only possible set of conditions within which one
can live in community with others while enjoying some domain of
entitlement that is secure from the power of others. When a gov-
ernment pursues its objectives through the rule of law it governs
consistently with those conditions . . . Such a system of reliably en-
forced rules represents the only conditions within which one can
live in a political community and nevertheless enjoy a degree of
freedom (independence).98
Further, and importantly, the procedures of law allow citizens to
engage with and even shift the law’s meaning. The procedures of law
ensure participatory rights, that the law considers the perspective and
personhood of those to whom it applies.99 Further, the law has “sys-
tematicity.”100 The law is not a series of precepts that can be applied to
any given situation; rather, it creates and applies norms and rules
through a structure of argument and interpretation. The meaning of
those norms and rules evolve over time, and can even be “discovered.”
Provided a specific norm can be identified or justified within the sys-
tem as a whole, that norm can be said to be part of the system. The law
structurally permits people to take a position on what the law ought to
be given how law works in general, and other relevant criteria.101 The
law does not exist as a set of rules superimposed on the citizenry.
Rather, it “pays respect to the persons who live under it, conceiving
them now as bearers of individual reason and intelligence”102 who can
be expected to think about and engage with the legal system that ap-
plies to them:
[The law] also respects the dignity of reasoning and even argumen-
tativeness. The individuals whose lives law governs are thinkers who
can grasp and grapple with the rationale of that governance and
relate it in complex but intelligible ways to their own view of the
relation between their actions and purposes and the actions and
purposes of the state.103
Rule by law in a democratic society thus creates a legitimate and
authoritative form of resolution for our moral differences. It does so
in a way that respects the autonomy and dignity of those subject to it,
allowing them freedom of action within its boundaries, and the ability
98. Simmonds, supra note 92, at 142–43.
99. Waldron, Concept, supra note 93, at 23–24.
100. Id. at 32.
101. Waldron, Concept, supra note 93, at 36.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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to engage with and shape the law as it applies to them. What follows
from that for understanding the lawyer’s role in the legal system?
Rule by Law and the Lawyer’s Role
In this modified positivist framework, the law has moral authority
as the means for ensuring legitimate and peaceful coordination and
settlement of our disagreements. The law is also a form and process of
governance which respects the autonomy and dignity of those to
whom it applies. Accomplishing legality in this sense requires the
availability of legal service providers—or lawyers.104 It requires people
who have the knowledge and skills to advise people what the law
means and requires and to facilitate voluntary compliance with the
law. It requires people who can advocate within the law’s processes of
dispute resolution, and work with the law’s systematicity and complex-
ity. In general it requires people who allow the citizenry to have access
to the social settlement that the law creates and to exercise the free-
dom of choice within the law’s constraints that rule by law permits.
This is the work that lawyers do. They advise and advocate within
the boundaries of legality, but without accountability for what moral-
ity would otherwise require. They serve their clients and the law, with-
out exercising personal moral judgment or accountability for the ends
their clients pursue within those legal boundaries. Indeed, the law-
yer’s role necessarily precludes the lawyer’s pursuit of her personal
moral values, at least at the point where she provides legal services to a
client.105 A lawyer who imposes her own moral values on a client sub-
jects that client to rule by lawyer not rule by law, undermining both
the law’s function as a form of social settlement and the domain of
freedom that rule by law creates. Further, she would preclude the abil-
ity of the citizen to engage with, contest, and even shift the law’s
meaning.
The modified positivist theory makes the lawyer a conduit for the
relationship of respect between the governed and the governing that
104. Although not necessarily lawyers; persons with the training necessary to fulfill this
role do not necessarily need the training and licensure we associated with lawyers. See Alice
Woolley & Trevor Farrow, Addressing Access to Justice Through New Legal Service Providers: Op-
portunities and Challenges, 3 TEX. A & M L. REV. 549, 550-1 (2016).
105. As Tim Dare argues, lawyers remain morally accountable, and may seek other
means for redressing what they perceive as moral wrongdoing within their professional
role, and in particular to reduce tension between the norms of morality and legality. See
Dare, supra note 88, at 151–52. See Alice Woolley, Context, Meaning and Morality in the Life of
the Lawyer, 17 LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1 (2014) (discussing the ethical challenges this can create
for lawyers in establishing a meaningful life).
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rule by law contemplates and creates. To achieve this function the
lawyer must necessarily defer to the client and to the law, rather than
to moral norms, or her own values and judgments.106 The normative
foundations of the lawyer’s role do not simply justify a morally neutral
or problematic aspect to that role, they require it. A lawyer cannot be a
lawyer while simultaneously restricting her representation of a client
based on extra-legal considerations, even ones of morality or virtue.
Further, because of the highly contested nature of many ques-
tions in a modern pluralistic society, a lawyer who advances a client’s
interests within the framework of legality will always run contrary to
the deeply held values of someone, moral or otherwise. Legal norms
resolve disputed questions—our economic, social, political, familial,
and moral relations—and a lawyer advising or advocating for a client
necessarily takes a stand on those questions. No matter who she repre-
sents and how tight her respect for legality, she works at the point
where our values conflict and advances some values over others as
chosen by her client.
In addition, a lawyer will take a contrary or even adversarial posi-
tion to the interests of others or the community as a whole, and may
participate in the infliction of harm on others. Her concern for others
stops with her client and the law, rather than being directed at the
community as a whole. In doing so she does not act without ethical
justification, provided that her conduct remains within the bounda-
ries of legality. Indeed, she can claim ethical justification for her con-
duct, but that conduct is nonetheless injurious to communal and
other interests.
The Problem with Women Lawyers
The Woman Problem
As discussed in Part III, the normative structure of the lawyer’s
role links to the complex attitude society has towards lawyers and the
work that they do. People recognize the importance of the peaceful
settlement of our disagreements, and the freedom of people to pur-
sue their own conception of the good within that social settlement,
and even recognize the importance of having lawyers to help enforce
that settlement and the space for personal autonomy. Yet, at the same
106. Except when the law gives the lawyer genuine discretion, or —for example, the
permission given to a lawyer to reveal confidential information “to prevent reasonably cer-
tain death or substantial bodily harm.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 1983).
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time, people see the costs that work imposes, and its preference for
legality—for “technicalities”—over substantive moral values of impor-
tance. The importance of the work that lawyers do creates, rather than
disrupts, the uncomfortable social position that they occupy.
Why, though, does that unpopularity and uncomfortable social
position look different for women? Why do women struggle to achieve
equality in the profession? Why do they risk personal gendered com-
mentary and criticism that male lawyers generally do not? In our view,
the most plausible explanation arises from the intersection between
the requirements of the lawyer’s role and prescriptive gendered ste-
reotypes about how women ought to act. By virtue of her role—pursu-
ing client interests within the bounds of legality—a lawyer is required
to be competent, authoritative, and rational. She acts in the interests
of her client, not in the interests of others, and will not be deferential,
generally concerned with the interests of others or act with emotional
sensitivity, except insofar as doing any of those things advances her
client’s interests within the bounds of legality. But by acting in this
way, she not only violates our expectations of what women can do, she
also violates our standards about what women ought to do.
Robust psychological literature demonstrates the existence of
gender stereotypes, both descriptive—what we believe men and wo-
men can do and be—and prescriptive—what we believe men and wo-
men ought to do and be. In general, we believe that men ought to
reflect agentic qualities, to be focused on achievement, to have an “in-
clination to take charge” and to be autonomous and rational.107 Si-
multaneously we believe that women ought to reflect communal
qualities, to be concerned about others, to seek affiliation, and to be
deferential and emotionally sensitive.108 These qualities can be articu-
lated in more detail, and have been identified consistently over
time109 and across cultures:110
Feminine characteristics are: affectionate, cheerful, childlike, com-
passionate, does not use harsh language, eager to soothe hurt feel-
ings, feminine, flatterable, gentle, gullible, loves children, loyal,
sensitive to the needs of others, shy, soft-spoken, sympathetic,
tender, understanding, warm, and yielding. Masculine characteris-
107. Heilman, supra note 15, at 115, 123.
108. Id.
109. Deborah A. Prentice & Erica Carranza, What Women and Men Should Be, Shouldn’t
Be, Are Allowed to Be, and Don’t Have to Be: The Contents of Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes, 26
PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 269, 270 (2002); Elizabeth L. Haines, Kay Deux & Nicole Lofaro,
The Times They Are a-Changing . . . or Are They Not? A Comparison of Gender Stereotypes, 1983-
2014, 40 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 353, 359 (2016); Rudman & Phelan, supra note 14.
110. Heilman, supra note 15, at 115.
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tics are: acts as a leader, aggressive, ambitious, analytical, assertive,
athletic, competitive, defends own beliefs, dominant, forceful, has
leadership abilities, independent, individualistic, makes decisions
easily, masculine, self-reliant, self-sufficient, strong personality, will-
ing to take a stand, and willing to take risks.111
Prescriptive gender stereotypes are “oppositional”; women ought
not to exhibit traditional male qualities, and men ought not to exhibit
traditional female qualities.112 Women “are prohibited from demon-
strating the self-assertion, dominance, and achievement orientation so
celebrated in men,” and are expected to be “communal, demonstrat-
ing socially sensitive and nurturing attributes reflecting their concern
for others.”113
The literature also demonstrates that women who violate pre-
scriptive gender stereotypes will experience “social censure and per-
sonally directed negativity,”114 will be viewed as “less socially
appealing,” and will be “less liked and more personally derogated” in
relation to men with similar qualities.115 Further, women will experi-
ence greater negative reactions for violations of expectations about
appropriate female behavior. An absence of communal behavior may
result in a woman being “characterized as the antithesis of the female
nurturer—as the quintessential ‘bitch’ who is concerned not at all
about others but only about herself.”116 Women may also be especially
subject to backlash or hostility when they demonstrate negative but
masculine qualities, for example, being arrogant or aggressive as op-
posed to competent and assertive.117 As generally summarized by Rud-
man and Phelan:
In fact, evidence now abounds that female agency can result in
backlash effects, defined as social and economic repercussions for
disconfirming prescriptive stereotypes. Although women must pre-
111. Prentice & Carranza, supra note 109, at 169.
112. Heilman, supra note 15, at 115.
113. Id. at 123.
114. Madeline E. Heilman, Aaron S. Wallen, Daniella Fuchs & Melinda Tamkins, Penal-
ties for success: Reactions to women who succeed at male gender-typed tasks, 89 J. OF APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 416, 417 (2004).
115. Id. at 426; see also Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive gender stereotypes and
backlash toward agentic women, 57 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 743, 758; Rudman & Phelan, supra note
14; Laurie A. Rudman, Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, Julie E. Phelan & Sanne Nauts, Status
Incongruity and backlash effects: Defending the gender hierarchy motivates prejudice against female
leaders, 48 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 165, 165 (2012); Andrea C. Vial, James L.
Napier & Victoria L. Brescoll, A bed of thorns: Female leaders and the self-reinforcing cycle of
illegitimacy, 27 THE LEADERSHIP Q. 400–14 (2016).
116. Madeline E. Heilman & Tyler G. Okimoto, Why are women penalized for success at
male tasks?: The implied communality deficit, 92 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 81, 82 (2007).
117. Prentice & Carranza, supra note 109, at 280.
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sent themselves as self- confident, assertive, and competitive to be
viewed as qualified for leadership roles, when they do so, they risk
social and economic reprisals. Specifically, agentic women are
rated as highly competent and capable of leadership, but they are
also viewed as socially deficient and unlikable by both male and
female perceivers. For example, successful female managers are
perceived to be more hostile, selfish, devious and quarrelsome,
compared with male counterparts. This type of bias is evident in
the epithets often applied to powerful women, such as ‘‘dragon
lady,’’ ‘‘battleaxe’’ and ‘‘iron maiden.’’118
The evidence suggests that a woman in leadership may be able to
alleviate some of these challenges if she adopts “participatory styles of
leadership,”119 or if she can exhibit communal qualities, either di-
rectly through her work or by virtue of her status as, for example, a
mother.120 However, doing so may prevent a woman from being per-
ceived as qualified to occupy a leadership position in the first place,
since that position requires her to demonstrate that she possesses mas-
culine qualities. Success without backlash requires the capacity and
opportunity to combine the ideal masculine capacities, without dem-
onstrating an absence of ideal female capacities: “[I]t is not easy to be
competent and effective without offending anyone’s sensibilities, nor
to be warm and creative without taking one’s eye off the instrumental
goal.”121
The combination of these prescriptive gender stereotypes with
the requirements of the lawyer’s role explains the experience of wo-
men lawyers. It explains why women are more likely to be viewed as
not up to the job. It explains why traditional narratives around lawyer
conduct tend to evoke models of masculinity—whether Rambo or At-
ticus Finch.122 It explains the tendency to focus on women’s feminine
accomplishments—their looks, their clothes, their families, and their
children. And it explains the harsh, derogatory, and sexist backlash
that women lawyers sometimes experience.
Being a lawyer requires the prescribed masculine qualities, and
much of the time it precludes the prescribed feminine ones. A lawyer
representing the interests of a client within the bounds of legality has
to focus on accomplishment of the client’s goals. She has to be “asser-
118. Rudman & Phelan, supra note 14, at 64 (citations omitted).
119. Rudman et al, supra note 115, at 176.
120. Heilman & Okimoto, supra note 116, at 91.
121. Prentice & Carranza, supra note 109, at 280.
122. See generally Salyzyn, supra note 47; see also Watson-Hamilton, supra note 47; see, e.g.,
Sommerlad and Backhouse, supra note 17 and Sommerlad, Thornton, and Collier, supra
note 20 (also confirming the sociological analysis of gender in law and legal practice).
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tive, dominant [and] forceful.” She must be “independent, self-reli-
ant, decisive . . . analytical, logical [and] objective.”123 Further, she
cannot consistently be “kind, caring, considerate . . . warm, friendly,
collaborative . . . obedient, respectful, self-effacing . . . perceptive, in-
tuitive, understanding.”124 Those qualities may be helpful from time
to time, particularly in advising a client or in negotiation, but they are
simply inconsistent with much of the work that lawyers do, particularly
when acting as zealous advocates in an adversarial trial. No lawyer
cross-examining a hostile witness can realistically expect to be per-
ceived as kind, caring, or considerate.
Given descriptive gender stereotypes, women can expect to be
seen as less likely to be able to do the work that lawyers do. Further,
women who receive favorable attention or media coverage can expect
that coverage to focus on their counter-acting feminine qualities, par-
ticularly their beauty, compliance with norms of feminine dress and
attire, or their commitment to their families and children. Coverage
will not focus exclusively on their work, because if the coverage fo-
cused on their lawyerly conduct or abilities it would, in terms of pre-
scriptive gender stereotyping, not be positive coverage. No feminine
virtues can arise from doing the job itself. Finally, women risk being
targets of gendered hostility, because being a good lawyer means be-
ing a bad woman. It means abandoning or acting contrary to the com-
munal behavior women ought to exhibit, in favor of the agentic values
men ought to exhibit. This is particularly so if the woman is an aggres-
sive lawyer, exhibiting the kind of zeal and occasional incivility that
the profession frowns upon, since doing so could be considered a vio-
lation of a “gender-intensified proscription.”125
The issues for women do not, however, arise simply because of
the occasionally adversarial nature of lawyer’s work. They rather arise
because of the lawyer’s role as understood through a modified positiv-
ist perspective. The woman lawyer in that role will act to assert individ-
ual interests against communal values, whether of morality or—
insofar as her client contests its meaning or application—of the law
itself. The moral ambiguity of the lawyer’s role that scholars identify as
the source of lawyer unpopularity will hit women particularly hard be-
cause it is necessarily non-communal. The woman asserts her client’s
interests and needs even where it hurts others, even where doing so
requires challenging current legal norms, and doing so violates ac-
123. Heilman, supra note 15, at 115.
124. Id.
125. Prentice & Carranza, supra note 109, at 280.
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cepted moral norms. She asserts rather than appeases, and she resists
rather than conforms, even outside an adversarial trial. By doing so,
she violates prescriptive gender stereotypes.
It also means that women lawyers cannot adopt the ameliorating
strategies sometimes available to women in leadership, at least within
the confines of traditional legal practice. The job itself does not per-
mit the consistent exhibition of communal values, at least not where
the lawyer pursues the interests of a client. Pursuing client interests
necessarily conflicts with acting in an affiliative or deferential way in
relation to others. A woman may be able to assert her compliance with
gendered norms in other ways, through her dress or demeanor, but
those factors are unlikely to counter-act the violation of gender pre-
scriptions that the lawyer’s role requires. They may simply become an-
other basis for criticism, suggesting that the woman is hypocritical or
sexually transgressive if she succeeds in communicating femininity, or
as additional evidence of her lack of feminine virtue if she fails to do
so.
Further, while the literature on the consequences for women who
violate prescriptive gender stereotypes focuses on women who ad-
vance in their careers or occupy leadership roles, a woman lawyer may
experience the consequences of violating prescriptive gender stereo-
types at any point in her career. Since the issues arise by virtue of the
role, a woman merely needs to occupy the role to violate gender
norms; she does not need to have a leadership role or professional
success. Although, women who do so have compounded risks of per-
sonal attacks, since they may be perceived as having further violated
prescriptive gender stereotypes.
Some professional roles may cause less difficulty for women than
others—a woman who advises behind the scenes will have greater op-
portunities for apparently communal behavior than a woman who
goes to court. Ultimately, however, even the lawyer as advisor risks
backlash. Her advice to her client may be contrary to the interests of
others; it may assist the client to do things that the law permits but
morality condemns. To the extent her participation in that conduct is
known, she risks being perceived as violating prescriptive gender
stereotypes.
Further, certain roles that women lawyers pursue or occupy, espe-
cially in politics, heighten the difficulties that the role creates. Hold-
ing political office arguably creates more opportunities for the
expression of communal virtues, to be warm, sensitive, and to pursue
communal interests and values. At the same time, however, politics is
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the point where the social settlement of law arises; politics exists to
permit peaceful resolution of our disagreements. That means, there-
fore, that a woman lawyer in politics in a sense occupies ground zero
of the problem of the lawyer’s role. She participates in choosing some
moral values over others, and by doing so again must necessarily
demonstrate agentic virtues rather than communal ones. She may
have greater opportunities to ameliorate the issue through also dem-
onstrating communal virtues than are, say, available to a criminal de-
fense lawyer, but she also has greater risks by virtue of her direct
participation in the creation of the social settlement of law.
Further, a woman who seeks political office must necessarily have
and demonstrate ambition. By definition you cannot seek something
without actually seeking it, and doing so violates prescriptive norms
about how women ought to behave. Indeed, insofar as it is conduct we
find unappealing in men as well, women who engage in it may experi-
ence heightened risks of backlash, since it is women who demonstrate
non-preferred masculine behavior or an absence of preferred femi-
nine behavior who are most vulnerable.
Overstating the Case?
The argument is, then, that by virtue of the lawyer’s role, a wo-
man who occupies that role necessarily violates gender stereotypes,
and faces challenges as a result. She may be identified as less suitable
for the role. She may find that people care about her demonstration
of communal values—or she may find it necessary to find ways to
demonstrate her commitment to communal values in order to be per-
ceived as likeable or appropriate despite her work as a lawyer. Or she
may find herself subject to personal attacks and criticisms, labeled un-
likable or unpleasant because of her professional work.
One response to that argument is, bluntly, it overstates the case.
As noted in Part II, women have had enormous successes in the legal
profession, including at the highest level. If what we described were
true, how could that be possible? Many women work as litigators, as
corporate counsel, as academics, and as judges, without experiencing
the sorts of vicious public attacks that we also described in Part II, or
that our argument here would suggest are likely to occur.
We largely concede that objection. Our argument is not that
every woman lawyer experiences vicious personal attacks, fails to ad-
vance because of doubts in her ability, or spends her legal career en-
gaging in compensating communal behavior to avoid backlash.
Rather, our point is that the combination of the lawyer’s role with
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prescriptive gender stereotypes explains why these things do occur for
some women, some of the time. Just like analysis of lawyer unpopular-
ity does not assert that everyone dislikes lawyers all of the time, we are
not asserting that all women lawyers experience gender-related attacks
and challenges. We claim only that this analysis explains why such at-
tacks and challenges occur.
In addition, however, we would claim that every woman lawyer is
at risk of being criticized and attacked in this way, or of having her
abilities marginalized relative to male lawyers, and that many women
do experience it. We would also claim that women lawyers recognize
those risks, will adjust and engage in compensating behaviors to avoid
their occurrence, and will suffer significant personal consequences if
they end up on the wrong side of a gender backlash. We are, in other
words, claiming that this problem is a significant one for all women in
the profession, even if not one that is universally experienced, or that
presents itself in the same way for every woman lawyer.
Changing the Role?
Part IV of this paper considered the lawyer’s role from a modified
positivist perspective, in part because that perspective reflects to a sig-
nificant extent the norms and practices currently governing common
law lawyers. The modified positivist perspective is, however, only one
way to think about the lawyer’s role, and it is one that some scholars
view as impoverished and inadequate—as simply reifying existing defi-
ciencies in the morality of legal practice. If another perspective were
adopted, and the lawyer’s role shifted accordingly, would that improve
the circumstances of women lawyers?
Deborah Rhode has directly argued that feminism supports nor-
mative arguments against the role morality of lawyers that the modi-
fied positivist perspective justifies. In her view, from “most feminists’
perspective, a preferable alternative would break down the boundary
between personal and professional ethics. In essence, lawyers should
accept direct moral accountability for their professional acts.”126
126. Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 49
(1994). Rhode suggests that from “feminists’ standpoint, this conventional justification for
the partisanship role is too abstract and acontextual to yield morally satisfying outcomes.”
Id. at 47. In addition, the traditional perspective improperly “collapses legal and moral
entitlements” and fails “to explain why rights of clients should trump those of all other
individuals whose interests are inadequately represented.” Id. at 48. And finally, “the sub-
mersion of self into role carries a price not only for the public in general, but for lawyers in
particular.” Id. at 48. We do not accept Rhode’s argument that feminism is inconsistent
with the modified positivist perspective.
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Whether or not resulting from “most feminists’ perspective,”127 the
assertion that role morality ought to be subject to the primacy of ordi-
nary moral accountability is a respected alternative to the modified
positivist argument.128 It asserts that the law can never eliminate
moral demands; a lawyer is always a moral agent, such that while there
may be a “presumption in favor of professional obligation” that pre-
sumption can be rebutted and, ultimately, “when professional and se-
rious moral obligation conflict, moral obligation takes precedent.”129
Other normative positions include the perspective that lawyers
ought to approach the law within a Dworkinian framework, collapsing
the boundaries between law and morality by interpreting the law con-
sistent with its internal moral structure—doing in any given case what
justice in that sense requires. A lawyer ought to take those “actions
that, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case,
seem likely to promote justice”—that is, which have legal merit.130
More recently, some scholars have suggested that, even if a lawyer may
take a positivist stance in relation to the law when she seeks “merely to
describe the law or to predict how others will interpret it,” she should
take a natural law approach when she seeks “moral guidance” from
the law.131
Whatever the merits of these other perspectives, however, if they
were adopted, and the role and practices of lawyers shifted to reflect
them, it would be unlikely to make any difference to the day-to-day
experiences of women lawyers. The lawyer acting in accordance with
those perspectives will, one way or another, incorporate morality into
her deliberations. She will make decisions that either advance or con-
strain her representation of client interests to be consistent with ordi-
nary morality, Dworkinian concepts of legal morality, or taking into
account moral facts at points when interpreting law from which she or
127. In our view feminism is quite consistent with modified positivism.
128. Indeed, the modified positivist perspective as explained in the prior section can
be largely understood as a response to the arguments made by LUBAN et al., supra note 92.
129. Id. at 63; see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988);
Gerald Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980); Rich-
ard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
130. WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 138
(Harv. U. Press, 1998); see also William Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1083 (1988); David Tanovich, Law’s Ambition and the Reconstruction of Role Morality in
Canada, 28 DAL. L.J. 267, 284 (2005).
131. Joshua P. Davis, Legal Dualism, Legal Ethics, and Fidelity to Law, J. OF THE PROF’L
LAWYERS 1, 2 (2016); see Amy Salyzyn, Positivist Legal Ethics Theory and the Law Governing
Lawyers: A Few Puzzles, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063 (2014) (raising related but distinct
questions).
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her client derives moral guidance. In doing so, she will still advance
some interests over others and assert those claims—whether moral or
not—against the demands of the state or community. There is no par-
ticular reason to believe that in the highly contested moral world we
currently occupy, pursuing moral values necessarily permits greater
adherence to communal values such as deference, connectedness,
nurturing, or emotional sensitivity. That woman lawyer may, in fact,
have an additional obligation to assert agency and power in relation to
her client, denying her client the ability to pursue claims that, descrip-
tively, the law might permit but morality would preclude. In short, the
woman lawyer working under one of these alternative conceptions
will, by virtue of her satisfaction of that role, violate the same prescrip-
tive gender stereotypes that she violates now, just in a different way.
Changing the lawyer’s role in response to different normative justifica-
tions may or may not be worth doing, but doing so will not meaning-
fully contribute to improving the experiences of women lawyers.
Observations and Consequences
The point of this paper has been to argue that the troubling ex-
periences of women lawyers arise by virtue of the role those women
occupy. If correct, that argument suggests that those problems will not
be easily resolved. Despite consequential changes in our attitudes
about women, and the opportunities available to them, descriptive
and prescriptive gender stereotypes appear robust and resilient, and
continue to shape how we see and treat women who act contrary to
those stereotypes. The tension between the lawyer’s role and descrip-
tive and prescriptive gender stereotypes means that the problems ex-
perienced by women lawyers are likely to persist.
That means, in turn, that there may be reason for pessimism
about efforts to improve diversity in the profession. Even if women
have better mentoring, or opportunities for flexibility and work-life
balance, that will not necessarily place them on the same footing as
men in relation to professional opportunities or advancement. Wo-
men may also have reasons to opt out of the profession beyond those
related to the demands and inflexibility of the job. Women may cor-
rectly perceive that occupying the professional role has costs for them
that do not exist for men, and may choose careers where they face less
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risks of backlash. The extreme case of Hillary Clinton creates a dis-
heartening and discouraging example for women lawyers.132
It also means, as earlier noted, that there are limits in the ability
of women to avoid these risks through their own conduct or behavior,
while still satisfying their professional obligations. Women may choose
areas or types of practice that reduce the tension with gender stereo-
types, but they cannot eliminate the risk entirely. Women may find it
useful to have support networks to help them deal with the challenges
that they personally experience. They may also look to role models
and examples—like Hillary Clinton—of the resilience that is possible
in the face of misogyny and sexist attacks. To understand that the sex-
ism they experience is not their fault, but is also something that they
can withstand, survive and, one way or another, overcome. Hillary
Clinton may have lost the election, but she was not defeated. As Marie
Henein noted in a lecture to University of Calgary law students in Jan-
uary 2017, young women lawyers should know that legal practice is
hard, but that they can do it, and that they are not alone.133
At the same time, however, these observations invite us to be care-
ful and vigilant in checking our criticisms of women lawyers to moder-
ate or eliminate the aspects that flow from violations of gender
stereotypes rather than violations of actual moral or ethical norms. To
be aware of the fact that all of us absorb gender stereotypes to some
extent, and that our discomfort with women like Marcia Clark or Glo-
ria Allred may arise in part from their being women lawyers rather
than from them being frumpy, cold or attention-seeking. In expres-
sing legitimate disagreement with Hillary Clinton’s policies, it is im-
perative to acknowledge the sexism that has imbued public
conversation about her over the past several decades, and how that
sexism shapes our perceptions of who she is and what she has done. It
is not a reason to ignore or reduce genuine political disagreement,
but any conversation about her that ignores the misogyny that has in-
fected public discussion of her policies and her conduct is unin-
formed at best and willfully blind at worst.
It can be difficult to distinguish between fair criticism and back-
lash. It can be hard to know when talking about a woman lawyer’s
132. Marie Henein, Thank you, Hillary. Now women know retreat is not an option, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL (last updated Nov. 11, 2016, 1:02 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.
com/opinion/thank-you-hillary-women-now-know-retreat-is-not-an-option/article328
03341/ [https://perma.cc/D7CK-C7WC].
133. Marie Henein, Milvain Lecture in Advocacy at the University of Calgary (Jan. 6,
2017).
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children and family is humanizing in the way that Sports Illustrated’s
coverage of athletes is, and when it is pandering to our need to make
that woman’s advocacy palatable. When we judge the competency and
commitment of women lawyers we may struggle to distinguish be-
tween legitimate observations and the filtering those observations
through our implicit biases about what women can and cannot do.
But we need to try. At minimum, we need to see the way in which the
intersection between our stereotypes and the lawyer’s role creates the
risk that we will err in these sorts of ways.
Finally, we need to acknowledge the limitations in our normative
accomplishments in relation to the rule of law. We may have achieved
a social settlement for our disagreements, and a system designed to
respect the dignity and autonomy of those to whom the law applies.
We may have created the social role of the lawyer to make those nor-
mative ambitions a reality for the people to whom the law applies. In
doing so we have, by virtue of our limited imagination and capacities,
also created a role which subjects the women who fulfill it to potential
assaults on their autonomy and their dignity. Women who work to
accomplish the law’s respect for dignity risk having their own under-
mined. In that respect at least, the accomplishment of law falters.
Conclusion
We began to write this paper in the spring of 2016 because of our
observations about the way people talk about women lawyers—the way
women lawyers are attacked and criticized, and the focus on their ap-
pearance, their sexuality, and their families. If we looked more closely,
would we confirm our observations or contradict them? If we con-
firmed them, could we explain them? The paper took on more ur-
gency after the defeat of Hillary Clinton, and our sense that that
defeat both validated the misogynist rhetoric to which she had been
subjected, and made casting light upon its misogyny more important.
We wanted to emphasize unequivocally that misogynist attacks did
happen to her, they did matter, they were not fair, and they were not
her fault. Whatever fair criticisms could have been offered about her
or her campaign, she neither asked for nor deserved the vicious and
sexist attacks targeting her. And, finally, we wanted to connect the
misogyny of the attacks on her to our observations about the exper-
iences of women lawyers generally—that, in a sense, Hillary Clinton is
all of us.
In doing so, in arguing that the intersection of the lawyer’s role
with gender stereotypes creates challenges for women and in particu-
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lar the risk of gendered commentary and criticism, we recognize the
accomplishments of women in law. We firmly believe that women have
the ability to overcome the challenges that they face. But we also think
its important for people to see the gender stereotypes that underlie
how we perceive, discuss and criticize women lawyers and to appreci-
ate the costs that stereotypes impose not only upon particular women,
but also to women lawyers as a whole. Women lawyers, especially
young women lawyers, need to be given support and resources to navi-
gate these challenges, but the profession as a whole needs to be aware
of the unique costs to women in occupying the lawyer’s role, however
central that role is to the accomplishment of the rule of law in a free
and democratic society.
